As an active-duty soldier, McMaster probably felt compelled to accept the job out of deference to the commander-in-chief—whoever he or she. A Review Essay of H. R. McMaster’s. Dereliction of Duty. JAMES J. WIRTZ. Few events in recent memory have received as much scholarly and popular attention . The book was Dereliction of Duty, a published version of a recent McMaster’s subtitle was “Lyndon Johnson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the.

Many individuals and groups in Vietnam played a varied role. While I appreciated McMaster’s thorough command of the subject and sometimes to-the-minute information, I found it very difficult to ever build momentum or get into the book.

H.R. McMaster’s ‘Dereliction of Duty’ – Washington Times

Eventually,in just a few years, the “war” ripped apart the fabric of the nation creating wounds t Today’s seemingly loss of respect for government in the United States by its citizens surely had its roots established during the LBJ administration.

To ask other readers questions about Dhty of Dutyplease sign up. On that subject I have little to contribute, but with the observance of the 50 th anniversary of the Vietnam War—the American part of it, anyway—now well underway, the impending opening of a major exhibition at the National Archives and the current release of the powerful new documentary produced by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, now is a good time to revisit some elements in the American understanding of the Vietnam War that I believed, and still believe, are a major impediment to a full understanding of that conflict.

Of course, Johnson essentially made his choice by not neglect. Mxmaster joint chiefs thus failed to provide the president with the best military advice available.

What McMaster Gets Wrong About Vietnam – POLITICO Magazine

Yes, there was a clear dereliction of duty, but even if that had not been the case, would the war have had a different outcome? No definitive answer can be given for dfreliction a counter-factual, but surely historians have insights into how Beijing and Moscow were thinking during this period and whether they would have engaged in Vietnam in the way China had in Korea a decade earlier.

I found the book to be an enthralling introduction to both subjects although certainly not the lightest read of my summer. Upper-echelon commanders are all company men, not mavericks.

It gives insight to Johnson’s thinking on to keep his public image credible to t This book is an incredible analysis of how and why the United States became involved in the disastrous war in Southeast Asia. But McMaster also conveys another message, perhaps inadvertently, which is relevant for more than historical reasons, namely that deceit and duplicity have been embedded in the Rereliction Branch of the government of the United States long before Donald Trump made them so apparent through his political inexperience.

This book is an incredible analysis of how and why the United States became involved in the disastrous war in Southeast Asia. He outlined his arguments about why America lost the Vietnam War, especially the misconceptions about the war by policy makers. President Johnson’s advisors proved unwilling or unable to provide clear, honest advice. It was lost in Washington, D.

Heres a guy who had a dry view of war effects until seeing face first and seeing what he has caused It you like histories of the bureaucratic minutiae and system failures that lead to bad advice badly given, institutional paralysis in the face of collapsing strategy and a determined refusual to accept reality which I do you will love this book.

I never knew Johnson, McNamara, the Bundy brothers and Taylor were such lying assholes, as well as Rusk, McNaughton and the other civilians in charge of planning the war. Preview — Dereliction of Duty by H.

The generals wanted a huge force and an open ended schedule to “win” the war with Vietnam and McNamara simply didn’t present it to Johnson. Why delve into a war if you have no intention of winning? May 29, Spectre rated it it was amazing Shelves: This book pinpoints the policies and motives that Johnson, McNamara and other top brass created while lying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the American public and the U. Can we straddle the divide between seeming soft on communism and being perceived as warmongers?

As the story progresses, the author turns his criticism towards the military, but only on the grounds of their actions such as failing to stand up to the Presidentnot whether their advice had merit.

H.R. McMaster’s own ‘Dereliction of Duty’

I cannot dyty that this is an excellent book, but it is a very interesting book. So, my experience with Marines was different from that of General McMaster — this certainly does not take away from the most important position of this book based on the facts. The ground war began in earnest although even then the White House would not admit the numbers involved.

The wars in Vietnam, she observed, long thought about in terms of black and white—colonialists vs. It is also essential to any study of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and its attempts to keep Viet Nam from occurring again. Aug 26, Scott Holstad rated it really liked it.

Lists with This Book. Feb 24, Susan rated it really liked it. This is the bleak message I take from McMaster.

McMaster would later rise to the rank of lieutenant general and serve in the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan before being appointed to the position of National Security Adviser by President Donald Trump in February The wars are unwinnable because — as in the Vietnam War — not a single government or non-state actor we are supporting commands popular legitimacy or could stay afloat financially or militarily absent a United States life preserver.

Fully and convincingly res “The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or the college campuses. I think HR McMaster does a good job of showing that we stumbled into war over a period of years.

In other words, I think the author cut the book short and that was disappointing. Jul 06, Adam rated it really liked it Shelves: For those that recall the return of PFC Garwood, we as young troops at the time in were quite taken by all the anger that was easily displayed by those above us — Garwood was supposedly captured in outside of Danang where the Marines had first landed in March of that year.

It is all too easy for a young military man to condemn the politi The book is exhaustive but it is also tedious and repetitive.

His tenure was by far the shortest ever served by a National Security Adviser. He didn’t pull out of Vietnam.

Jul 03, Gerry rated it it was amazing Shelves: Are there lessons here? According to McMaster, they lied to the President, to the Nation, and possibly even to themselves.

This is my second time reading this book mcmaste time was almost exactly 10 years ago in and I was less impressed with it this time around. McMaster points out that the service chiefs were not true commanders at the time of Vietnam.